Academia, Philosophy

Vilas Fund 2Q15 Commentary – The Efficacy of LSV, 1994 on Current Markets

When we wrote our maiden post on the academia of value investing by LSV, 1994, we received several queries from readers as to the strategy’s efficacy in the current times and market conditions. Today, we came across a blog post that might answer this question.

Below is an excerpt but we suggest you read the whole blog post.

Performance Highlights:

The Vilas Fund, LP, has substantially outperformed the S&P 500 Index and the HFR Fundamental Value Index since its inception in August, 2010:

Vilas Fund

The Vilas Fund, LP, has compounded at the following rates for the period ending June 30, 2015:

Vilas Fund

Further, the Vilas Fund has produced extraordinarily tax-efficient historical returns:

Vilas Fund

Assuming the highest Federal Tax Rate and a state effective tax rate of 5%, an investor in the Vilas Fund since inception would have lost, on average, only 0.68% per year to taxes.

Strategy Overview:

… The basic foundation of the Vilas Fund’s strategy is that cheap, undervalued stocks, defined as those stocks with low price-to-book, low price-to-earnings, and/or low price-to-cash flow ratios, outperform expensive companies over time. Further, those companies with low barriers to exit, low supplier power, low buyer power, strong brand names, little threat of substitutes or new entrants, and higher switching costs have better economic returns than those companies without these attributes. Lastly, when we identify materially overvalued equities with less than ideal economic and financial characteristics, we initiate and hold short positions with the goals of reducing portfolio risk and increasing expected return. We point to key excerpts from the “Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation and Risk” paper by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) that form the academic underpinning of our strategy …

Note: Credit goes to ValueWalk.com

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Uncategorized

Oil: An Update on Market Psychology

Last week we wrote a piece on market psychology. If you can recall (Its tough, we know. 8 days are a pretty long time.), It was quite a dark period then when there seems to be no bottom for both oil price and O&G companies.

Over the last week, Mr. Market had to endure a roller coaster ride. Beginning with what seems to be an effort to prop up the Chinese economy. Global market plunged on the Chinese government’s initiative to devalue its currency. Fearing the Chinese economy is running out of steam, Mr. Market decided to run his own GSS (Global Stock Sale).

The “fear” (VIX) chart says it all.

Vix Crazy

But all this are history now. Stocks have since rebounded strongly. In particular, oil price and O&G companies rallied on macro cues that oil demand might not be as sluggish as Mr. Market had thought.

What he thought was just 8 days ago. You get what I mean.

What “mood-lifting” events happened over the last 4 days?

Chinese government cuts interest rate by 25 basis point.

Taiwan and Chinese government pension funds buying up blue chip stocks.

Just last night, BEA reported 2nd quarter GDP revised upward from 2.3% to 3.7%. 

So all of a sudden, Mr. Market forgets all the demand fears he had?

Was he wrong 8 days ago?

“Looks like it.” you might say.

.

.

.

And you still trust him today.

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Behavioral Investing, Philosophy

Oil: Practical Lesson on Market Psychology

Market PsyGot a note this morning from a friend about our opinions on several Singapore Oil & Gas companies. So we thought this would be a good opportunity to touch on a related topic.

The present market sentiment on the O&G sector is certainly not short of depressing. Driven partly by broad market declines but largely by falling oil prices.

falling knife 2

In a not too distant memory, oil was trading for a consecutive 50+ months in the $85-$100 range. Back then, almost everyone sees these prices as at least sustainable, if not, bullish …

“There is a new reality in our business… $100/bbl is becoming the new $20/bbl in our business… costs have caught up to revenues for many classes of projects … If $100 is the new $20, consumers will pay more for oil”
— John Watson, CEO Chevron at 2014 IHS Energy Conference    
“The Brent crude oil price is projected to average $105/bbl and $101/bbl in 2014 and 2015, respectively …. EIA expects that WTI crude oil prices will average $93/bbl in 2014 and $90/bbl during 2015 … corresponding lower and upper limits of the 95% confidence interval were $82/bbl and $117/bbl” 
— U.S. Energy Information Administration, Feb 2014 STEO 
“… we anticipate that Brent will continue its appreciation to average around USD116.0/bbl in 2017 and USD125.0/bbl in 2020.” 
— Infield,  Research consultant for POSH IPO

… occasionally we do see some bears, small ones.

“Steve Briese, publisher and writer of the Bullish Review of Commodity Insiders newsletter, is currently projecting an imminent plunge in the oil price to the $70 region. His bearish outlook is based on the recent peak in the net short position of businesses involved with oil. ” 
— Barron’s, “Here comes $75 oil”, Mar 2014
“… we remain bearish on crude oil prices. Barring geopolitical wildcards and significant production hiccups, we look for WTI and Brent touch $85/bbl and $95/bbl respectively at end- 2014.. ” 
— OCBC, “Commodities Outlook 2014”, Jan 2014

This is not an exercise of criticism, instead, we want to highlight the predominant sentiment that governs the O&G market at that point of time — that when oil price was trending consistently higher in the $100+ region, its unimaginable to see a 60% crash.

“There got to be new data that supported the crash?” You might ask.

Absolutely there are.

But the fact is that majority of the arguments that supported the crash are there when oil price was $100 as they are today at $40: Shale boom, slowing global economy, stronger dollar etc. 

It is true that supply is more than demand. It is also true that price should fall if we have more oil than we need. But what is the right price? Surely most would have an opinion but certainly no one knows.

What we do know is that as the days go by, Mr. Market wants nothing to do with this trade. For this reason alone, it is worth a second look by the intelligent investor.

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Academia, Objective

The Academia of Value Investing: LSV, 1994

Speed Read:

♦ Value investors regularly challenge conventional wisdom but short of questioning their own. In particular the value investing approach. The value investing approach is attractive because it works, and not because it is advocated by certain famous investors.

♦ Our maiden post looks at a 1994 study by LSV which examines the performance of value stocks against glamour stocks. Their result showed that value stocks consistently outperform glamour stocks over the period 1963 to 1990.

Numerous literature have suggested that the outperformance is due to value stocks being fundamentally riskier. LSV have found no conclusive evidence that value stocks are riskier. Instead, the study has shown that value stocks exhibit extremely high reward-to-risk ratio.

♦ Beyond the results, LSV’s study provided lessons as to why “value investing is simple but not easy”. For the astute value investors, these lessons should be be seen as windows of opportunity.

Its fair to say that most of us come to know the Value Investing concept through certain successful value investors. Myself included. We began with an initial understanding that value investing approach entails purchasing companies at a price below their intrinsic value. This sounds readily intuitive – who doesn’t want to buy something on a bargain? Yet, only a handful of us questions the validity of this approach. After-all, how many value investors are truly successful than they are famous?

As value investors, we are required to constantly challenge the conventional wisdom. First and foremost, however, is always to question our own.

In our maiden post, we’ll examine the value investing approach through a 1994 study, “Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and Risk” by Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (LSV). For seasoned value investors and budding investors alike, this review serves as an anchor to the bumpy, but ultimately rewarding road of value investing.

 Value vs. Glamour

In this study, LSV attempt to provide insights into two key questions surrounding the value investing strategy. First, why value strategy works, and second, is value strategy fundamentally riskier?

Using accounting data from April 1963 to April 1990, LSV formed 10 portfolios (at the end of each April) from the NYSE and AMEX stock universe. These 10 portfolios are then rank based on the following 4 fundamental variables and classified accordingly as Value or Glamour portfolios. Value is defined as stocks with low price multiples / low sales growth, and Glamour as stocks with high price multiples / high sales growth.

  1. B/M = Book to Market ratio. This is simply the inverse of P/B ratio
  2. C/P = Cash flow to Market Price ratio. This is the inverse of P/CFO ratio
  3. E/P = TTM Earnings to Market Price ratio. This is the inverse of P/E ratio
  4. GS = Past 5-years average Sales growth rate

The stocks in each portfolio are equal weighted (i.e. same amount invested in each stock), with a buy-and-hold period of 1 to 5 years.

 Hands down, Value beats Glamour …

Value portfolio outperformed Glamour portfolio in every fundamental variable. Outperformance persisted even after adjusting for size effect (this is to account for the fact that smaller firms generally have higher business risk than bigger and more established firms).

On a 5-year compounded basis, the outperformance is pretty significant:

  1. B/M : Value = 146% vs. Glamour = 56%
  2. C/P : Value = 149% vs. Glamour = 54%
  3. E/P : Value = 139% vs. Glamour = 72%
  4. GS : Value = 143% vs. Glamour = 82%
VvsG2

Table 1

VvsG1

Table 2

… at No Significantly Higher Risk

In measuring risk, LSV made the assumption that value stocks are fundamentally riskier if they underperform glamour stocks in some states (e.g. economic boom, recession, down markets, up markets) of the world. Those states should also be “bad” states, in which the marginal utility of wealth is the highest (what this means is that in a recession, a dollar gain is “worth” more than a dollar gain in an economic boom), in which values stocks are unattractive to risk averse investors.

To put this in layman’s term, value stocks if riskier, should underperform glamour stocks in a time where investors are most risk averse.

The below table shows returns of Value portfolios minus Glamour portfolios from 1968 to 1989 (22 years). Each panel represents usage of different fundamental variables, similar to the above process. Negative numbers indicate the year where value underperform glamour (Red boxes). The Blue box categorizes the holding periods. 

Value minus Glamour

Table 3

A couple of key observations here. First, the occurrence of value underperforming glamour is quite low. Of the 22 years sample period, value underperformed glamour only on 5 occasions. Second, value is a clear winner as the time horizon increases. There were zero underpeformance for a 5-year holding period.

Could these periods of underperformance coincides with “bad” states?

As it turns out, value outperformed glamour in all identified “bad” states.

The below table shows the yearly Value minus Glamour returns during the 22 years period. The Red box indicates the “bad” states. R = Recession and D = Market declines.

bad states

Chart 1

Moving on to conventional risk measurements, the study found that value exhibited higher standard deviations than glamour. The difference however, is largely due to size effect and the standard deviations were greatly reduced after adjusting for size. To isolate large cap stocks, LSV went on to perform the same test on the largest 50% of the stock universe and found that investors could still get the extra return from value stocks without this higher standard deviation.

std dev

Table 4

Consider also this: over the period 1929 to 1988, the S&P 500’s extra return over the Treasury bills is 8% while the extra standard deviation is 18%. In comparison, value stocks outperformed glamour stocks by 10%, with extra standard deviation of only 3%, the reward to risk ratio is extremely high investing in value stocks.

What can we Learn from this Study?

Using Warren Buffett’s words, “Investing is simple but not easy“. Beyond proving that value strategy works, LSV has demonstrated with a simple method why only a handful of value investors truly beat the market.

What can we learn?

  • Doing nothing is difficult. If you recall, LSV employed a quantitative method that mathematically re-balances the portfolios annually. It requires no analysis of annual reports or financial statements and certainly no DCF. Often, we fell prey to the notion that effort equals result. This is largely true in life. In value investing however, less is often more.
  • Patience is virtue. In Table 3, we observe that as the holding period increases from 1-year to 5-year, value strategy greatly increases its winning rate. This apparently simple strategy is not easy – those who have been in the market would agree that 1 year isn’t that short a time. Let alone 5 years. To make things worse, a period of underperforming the market would likely shaken the will of the investors. Causing them to sell or buy stocks at a time where they should be doing otherwise. In chart 1, the periods where value underperformed glamour coincides with a rising stock market. Investors who jumped the value-ship would have missed out on the subsequent outperformance.
  • Growth (often) disappoints. Growth disappoints in both glamour and value stocks. As LSV so eloquently put it, “Investor expectations of future growth appear to have been excessively tied to past growth despite the fact that future growth rates are highly mean reverting. In particular, investor expect glamour firms to continue to grow faster than value firms, but they were systematically disappointed.” We have a very good article on growth which we’ll share in future post.

For the astute readers, you must be in silent rapture at this pessimism. So are we. For value strategy to work, the above must continue to hold true.

Do we expect this to change? We quote our answer from Reinhart and Rogoff (authors of “This Time is Different, Eight centuries of Financial Folly”), “… financial crisis follow a rhythm of boom and bus through the ages. Countries, institutions, and financial instruments may change across time, but human nature does not“.

Opportunities are in abundance for the intelligent investor.

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